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copyright notice appears on all such copies.Sensitive Product Designation in the Doha Round: The Case of Rice 
 
Effects of sensitive product designation in WTO trade reform on the international rice market are 
analyzed. A partial equilibrium framework is used.  Results suggest large impacts. Among 
exporters, China and the U.S., major suppliers of the Japanese and South Korean markets, are 
most negatively affected. 
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 Introduction 
Although the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 applied to 
industrial as well as agricultural products, it was not until the Uruguay Round of GATT that 
agriculture became a vital part of multilateral negotiations. In the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA) developed and developing countries, to different degrees, committed 
themselves to cap and decrease the levels of import tariffs, export subsidies, and trade-distorting 
domestic support (Amber and Blue Box payments). However, the impact of the URAA on 
achieving freer and more market-oriented agricultural markets is a debatable. Domestic support 
among OECD countries remains high even after the URAA
1, and more so for particular 
commodities such as rice and sugar, with producer subsidy equivalents (PSE) of 82 percent and 
45 percent, respectively (OECD, 2005). Import barriers remain high for agricultural products
2, as 
a result of either high import tariffs or a combination of small quotas and prohibitive over-quota 
tariffs in the cases of tariff-rate-quotas (TRQs). Tariff escalation also continues to be used, 
mainly among developing countries. Finally, export subsidies continue to be granted at still high 
levels, mainly by the European Union (EU) (Ingco and Nash, 2004).  
A new round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations began in Doha, Qatar, in 
November 2001 (known as the Doha Development Agenda, DDA). Negotiations on agriculture 
were included and were expected to be completed at the Hong Kong ministerial meeting in 
December 2005.  While the Hong Kong ministerial did produce an agreement on export 
subsidies, no agreement has been forthcoming on market access and domestic support. Despite 
the slow progress in agricultural negotiations and the differences that still exist among 
                                                 
1 Domestic support to agriculture among OECD countries is estimated at USD 311 billion in 2001. 
2 According to OECD (2001), average agricultural tariffs are about six times higher than for industrial tariffs. The 
fact that tariff cuts were measured, as average cuts instead of cuts in average tariffs, together with no trade-weighted 
averages, are factors argued to have constrained the effect of URAA. negotiating groups (WTO, 2005 a), estimates of potential benefits of DDA are substantial, even 
after more recent analyses have reduced the expected size of the impact. According to an earlier 
World Bank analysis (2002), benefits from global agricultural trade reform were estimated at 
around USD 248 billion
3, 57 percent of which would be captured by developing countries.  More 
recent analysis by the Hertel and Keeney (2005) using an updated GTAP model estimates full 
trade liberalization benefits to be only $85 billion, of which $55.7 billion would result from 
agricultural trade liberalization.  Anderson and Martin (2005) report benefits from global trade 
reform to be around USD 287 billion, of which $182 would derive from food and agriculture, 
and with developing countries capturing around 45 percent. However, according to the same 
authors, market access issues such as sensitive product designation and special safeguard 
mechanisms could greatly diminish the extent of the gains. They estimate that gains could shrink 
by 75 percent if 2 percent and 4 percent of the HS6 agricultural tariff lines for developed and 
developing countries, respectively, are classified as sensitive products
4.   
The main objective of this study is to analyze the effects of sensitive product designation 
on the international rice market. Two key assumptions of this study are, first, that four countries, 
namely, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines would request the sensitive product 
designation for rice; and secondly, it assumes that the provisions of the U.S. proposal would 
become the final outcome of the negotiations (table 1). As of December 2005, several proposals 
for agricultural reform were available, with varying approaches for how sensitive products 
should be treated. The impact of sensitive product designation is evaluated by comparing the 
results out of the U.S. proposal without special concessions for sensitive products with a scenario 
                                                 
3 This benefit is obtained assuming fixed productivity. When allowing for productivity changes, benefits more than 
double. 
4 Anderson and Martin do not state how the 2 percent and 4 percent of HS6 agricultural tariff lines are allocated. 
However, which products are to be designated as sensitive would greatly affect the results.     in which four countries, namely, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Philippines declare rice as 
sensitive product. 
Table 1. Outline of major provisions of the U.S. proposal for agricultural negotiations. 
Tariffs of Developed countries    Tariffs of Developing countries 
Tiers  Beginning of tier  End of tier    Tiers  Beginning of tier  End of tier 
0 – 20  55%  65%    0 – 20  36.67%  43.33% 
20 – 40  65%  75%    20 – 40  43.33%  50.00% 
40 – 60   75%  85%    40 – 60  50.00%  56.67% 
>60  85%  90%    >60  56.67%  60.00% 
Cap at  75%      Cap at  112.5%   
  Bound Overall Distorting Support  Reduction      AMS (Amber Box) bound  Reduction 
Over $60 billion  75%      Over $25 billion  83% 
$10-$60 billion  53%      $12-$25 billion  60% 
$0-$10 billion  31%      $0-$12 billion  37% 
de minimis threshold  2.5%         
Other Important Points 
1.  Volume of TRQs for sensitive products to increase by 7.5 percent of the consumption during the period 1999-01 
2.  Elimination of in-quota tariff, and reduction of over quota tariff by 20 percent 
3.  Cap Blue Box program payments at 2.5% of total value of agricultural production 
4.  Product specific and non-product specific de minimis threshold cut to 2.5%   
5.  Rapid elimination of export subsidies by no later than 2010. 
6.  More regulation on State Trading Agencies 
7.  Review of Food Aid policies, more discretion for donors to meet emergency status.  
8.  Elimination of differential export taxes. 
 
Sensitive Product Designation 
As a result of differences regarding how extremely high import tariffs are to be reduced, 
the special safeguard provisions outlined in article V of the URAA were included. The 
provisions gave developed and developing countries the chance to request special concessions 
regarding market access of relevant, highly protected, agricultural products. However, the 
URAA did not provide any framework on how these products would be designated. Four 
countries utilized the concessions and designated sensitive products, namely, Japan, Philippines, and South Korea for rice and Israel for some particular animal products. These countries 
established minimum market access (MMA) quotas that would progressively expand over the 
implementation period until reaching 8 percent of base period domestic consumption for 
developed and 4 percent for developing countries.  
Regarding sensitive products, the July 2004 Package that guides DDA negotiations states 
that, “without undermining the overall objective of the tiered [tariff reduction] approach, 
Members may designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated as 
sensitive, taking account of existing commitments for these products.” The framework also states 
that the principle of “substantial improvement” will apply to each sensitive product, and will be 
achieved through combinations of tariff quota commitments and tariff reductions applying to 
each product. As can be seen, the framework provides little guidance on how sensitive products 
are to be determined, the extent of the commitment, and how “substantial improvement” in 
market access expansion is to be achieved. 
Among agricultural products, rice is likely to be granted the sensitive designation by 
several countries, on the basis of various rationales including food security and to protect a 
culturally rooted activity. Japan has already expressed its intention to request sensitive product 
designation for rice as well as for other agricultural products (Asian Economic News, 2005).  
South Korea already negotiated in the WTO in 2005 an extension of MMA on rice, and 
committed to double its MMA to 8 percent over the next 10 years starting in 2005 (USTR, 
2005). Even with only these two countries declaring rice as sensitive product, gains from DDA 
for the rice sector would likely be significantly reduced based on the high level of protection they 
exercise. Whereas the global, trade-weighted import tariff on rice
5 is estimated at 50.5 percent in 
                                                 
5 Rice here represents the sum of paddy rice (HS100610); brown rice (HS100620); milled rice (HS100630); and 
broken rice (HS100640). The value of import policies is estimated at USD 3.1 billion. 2002, the ad-valorem import tariff equivalents for Japan and South Korea during the same period 
are estimated at 786 percent and 386 percent, respectively. These two countries primarily import 
medium grain processed rice
6, which suggests that changes in market access in these countries 
would primarily affect the medium grain rice trade sector and to a lesser extent the long grain 
segment through cross effects.  
Methodology 
The analysis is conducted using a partial equilibrium model developed for this study. 
This model enables us introduce a great level of sectoral detail and thus capture intra-sectoral 
impacts. It is a multi-region, multi-product model. It divides the global rice market into 53 
regions (including the major rice producers and traders), three rice types (long grain non-
aromatic, long grain aromatic, and medium + short grain rice), and three sectors, each generating 
one final product (paddy rice, brown or partially-milled rice, and white or fully-milled rice). The 
production side is represented by CES production functions, whereas the final demand for rice 
(by type) is represented by Cobb-Douglass demand functions. Import demand is modeled using 
the Armington approach. The baseline corresponds to fiscal year 2002. 
Results are decomposed using the approach suggested by Harrison, Horridge, and Pearson 
(2000). 
Policy Assumptions 
As previously cited, the main assumption of this study is that the final outcome of DDA 
agricultural negotiations is to be similar to the provisions of the U.S. proposal outlined in table 1 
above. The impact of sensitive product (SP) designation is evaluated by comparing the results 
from two scenarios: 
                                                 
6 South Korea’s MMA commitment in 1995 included more stringent import measures for fully processed rice. For 
this reason, South Korea became mainly a brown rice importer. In the case of Japan, most of its imports are of fully 
processed rice.   1.  USP Without SP: The U.S. proposal is to be implemented without granting special 
treatment to sensitive products; 
2.  USP With SP: U.S. proposal is to be implemented allowing Japan, South Korea, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines to declare rice as a sensitive product.    








Tariff  Quota Level  Applied Tariff
1 
Paddy Rice  USP Without SP  USP With SP   
Brazil  55%  25%  25%    3% 
El Salvador  40%  20%  20%    40% 
EU25  105%  10%  10%    87% 
Honduras  35%  18%  18%    25% 
Mexico  9%  5%  5%    1% 
            Brown Rice  USP Without SP  USP With SP   
Brazil  55%  25%  25%    0% 
EU25  104%  10%  10%    85% 
Japan  805%  75%  644%  97%  843% 
South Korea  471%  113%  377%  187%  388% 
            Milled Rice  USP Without SP  USP With SP   
Nigeria  150%  60%  60%    75% 
Brazil  55%  25%  25%    0% 
Indonesia  160%  64%  128%  3,844%
2
  30% 
Philippines  50%  23%  40%  274%  50% 
Japan  1066%  75%  853%  97%  780% 
South Korea  169%  68%  135%  187%  121% 
1. Information from own rice database. 
2. The volume of the TRQ agreed by Indonesia is 70 tmt. An increase of 7.5% of the average consumption in 1999-










Based on calculations from our rice database and the estimated impacts from the 
simulations, it is expected that reforms in the global rice market would significantly reduce 
actual trade barriers and tariff overhang. Tables 3 and 4 below show the aggregate market access 
figures for the baseline as well as the two scenarios under consideration. 
The results suggest that SP designation would greatly constrain expansion in market 
access for rice.  A significant reduction in both the overall applied and bound tariffs on rice is 
estimated for scenario USP Without SP, whereas practically no changes on the trade weighted 
applied tariff are expected in the scenario USP With SP. The estimations are based on the applied 
tariff by Japan and South Korea as the tariff-equivalent value of the quota rent. This assumption, 
along with the significant increase in medium grain market shares of both Japan and South 
Korea, result in still high estimates of applied tariffs in the medium grain market.   
Table 3. Trade-weighted applied and bound import tariffs for rice in 2002. 
Variable
1  Applied Import Tariff  Bound Import Tariff  Tariff Overhang 
All rice  42.7%  74.1%  31.4% 
Paddy rice  17.9%  35.0%  17.1% 
Of which LG  17.9%  35.0%  17.1% 
Brown rice  127.9%  158.8%  30.9% 
Of which LG  41.1%  76.9%  35.8% 
Of which MG  262.9%  286.1%  26.2% 
White Rice  40.1%  72.9%  32.8% 
Of which LG  24.0%  57.8%  33.8% 
Of which MG  227.9%  295.2%  67.3% 
Of which FR  26.7%  32.8%  6.2% 
1. LG: long grain; MG: medium grain; FR: fragrant rice. 
 
 
 Table 4. Trade-weighted applied and bound import tariffs for both scenarios. 
Variable  Applied Import Tariff  Bound Import Tariff  Tariff Overhang 
USP Without SP 
All rice  18.6%  22.8%  4.2% 
Paddy rice  11.6%  15.9%  4.5% 
Of which LG  11.6%  15.9%  4.5% 
Brown rice  48.5%  63.5%  15.0% 
Of which LG  5.6%  23.7%  18.1% 
Of which MG  80.6%  93.3%  12.7% 
White Rice  18.6%  22.8%  4.2% 
Of which LG  18.1%  22.7%  4.6% 
Of which MG  21.1%  21.3%  0.2% 
Of which FR  3.8%  4.4%  0.6% 
USP With SP 
All rice  39.6%  43.4%  3.8% 
Paddy rice  11.6%  16.0%  4.4% 
Of which LG  11.6%  16.0%  4.4% 
Brown rice  156.5%  165.0%  8.5% 
Of which LG  4.7%  22.6%  17.9% 
Of which MG  297.0%*  297.3%*  0.3% 
White Rice  34.2%  43.4%  9.2% 
Of which LG  8.3%  24.1%  15.8% 
Of which MG  183.7%  188.3%  4.6% 
Of which FR  24.8%  25.4%  0.6% 
*The increase in applied and bound import tariffs results from the significant market share gain of South Korea, 
which goes from 34% to 56% of total medium grain brown trade.  
 
Based on the partial equilibrium findings, SP designation by Japan, South Korea, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines would likely impact the global rice market significantly. Table 5 
presents the results of both scenarios on aggregate global rice trade and prices. The results 
suggest that rice trade would expand only slightly when SP designation is allowed. Increases in 
total rice trade are expected to be significant in the scenario USP Without SP. Paddy rice trade is 
estimated to slightly decrease in both scenarios. These findings, along with the increase in trade 
of brown and milled rice, suggest a significant reduction in tariff escalation, cited in the literature 
as a relevant problem in the rice market (Wailes et al, 2004). Further insight on the changes in tariff escalation effects can be obtained from analyzing the changes in U.S. rice exports 
presented in table 7 below.   
Most of the top rice traders are expected to benefit significantly as a result of the policy 
outcomes from both scenarios. However, India is expected to experience a large drop in 
aggregate exports. This is due to the fact that, during 2002, rice export subsidies were estimated 
at approximately 50 percent (USDA, FAS, 2002) and, as s result of the U.S. proposal, they are to 
be removed completely by the end of the implementation period.  
Table 5. Partial Equilibrium impact of U.S. proposal with and without SP designation on aggregate 
volume of trade and prices. 
Variable
1  USP Without SP  USP With SP 
Global Volume of Rice Trade  14.3%  0.8% 
Global Volume Trade Paddy Rice  -0.5%  -1.1% 
Of which LG  -0.5%  -1.1% 
Global Volume Trade Brown Rice  51.0%  33.5% 
Of which LG  5.3%  5.6% 
Of which MG  114.9%  75.7% 
Global Volume Trade White Rice  13.0%  -0.9% 
Of which LG  -5.8%  -8.3% 
Of which MG  142.9%  23.3% 
Of which FR  6.5%  7.6% 
World Price Paddy Rice  18.6%  16.2% 
Of which LG  18.6%  16.2% 
World Price Brown Rice  18.7%  16.0% 
Of which LG  8.6%  6.7% 
Of which MG  32.8%  28.6% 
World Price White Rice  17.5%  15.7% 
Of which LG  21.4%  19.2% 
Of which MG  23.4%  20.2% 
Of which FR  4.9%  4.8% 
 
Table 6 presents the estimated changes in the value of rice trade and the value market 
share for some of the major rice traders resulting from the two scenarios under consideration. In 
the aggregate, SP designation is expected to constrain the gains in value of exports by approximately 8 percent of the baseline value
7. The disaggregation of the result by type of rice 
and milling degree shows potential increases in trade value in all segments of the rice market, but 
more importantly for brown and fully processed rice. This also supports the idea that tariff 
escalation effects would decrease in either scenario, but to a greater extent in scenario USP 
Without SP.  
Table 6. Changes in value of rice trade (at world prices by type and milling degree) and market 
shares for major traders (valued at world prices) a result the policy reforms in both scenarios.  
Rice Type and Milling Degree  Base Share
1  USP Without SP  USP With SP 
Total Value of Rice Trade    35.3%  27.5% 
Total Value Paddy Exports    17.9%  14.9% 
Total Value Brown Exports    85.7%  60.0% 
Of which LG    13.9%  12.6% 
Of which MG    185.3%  26.1% 
Total Value White Exports    33.3%  14.3% 
Of which LG    14.4%  9.3% 
Of which MG    199.6%  48.2% 
OF which FR    11.7%  12.8% 
        Exporter  Base Share
1
  USP Without SP  USP With SP 
China  6.6%  18.4%  8.8% 
India  21.7%  9.2%  10.2% 
Thailand  29.5%  29.0%  33.1% 
USA  13.4%  15.7%  16.8% 
Vietnam  10.0%  10.7%  11.7% 
        Importer  Base Share
1
  USP Without SP  USP With SP 
Brazil  1.9%  1.5%  1.7% 
EU25  6.6%  5.7%  6.5% 
Indonesia  8.1%  6.4%  6.2% 
Japan  3.7%  16.2%  7.4% 
Philippines  4.9%  5.4%  4.7% 
South Korea  1.0%  2.8%  2.6% 
1. Source: Own rice database. 
 
                                                 
7 For the specific 2002 year, the total c.i.f. value of rice trade was estimated at USD 6.3 billion. Therefore, as of 
2002, SP designation would constrain the gains in trade value by slightly over USD 500 million.    The value market share among exporters is expected to be altered to some extent by the 
designation of SP. China and to a lesser extent the U.S. are expected to benefit the most from 
granting no special treatment to rice. As previously said, India is estimated to experience a 
dramatic decrease in exports, a situation that will be exacerbated to some extent as a result of the 
designation of rice as SP by Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
Results for importers also suggest a significant impact of SP designation, especially for 
Japan. Differences in the impact of either scenario on the market shares for South Korea, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines are expected to be minimal. 
The impact on the U.S. rice sector is a significant increase in rice production in both 
scenarios; however, SP designation is estimated to constrain the expansion in production to some 
degree (Table 7). The increase in rice output results from a remarkable increase in U.S. rice 
exports, since the aggregate final demand for domestic rice in the U.S. is expected to remain 
practically unchanged in both scenarios. The total value of U.S. rice production is expected to 
increase by 47 percent and 38 percent in the scenario USP Without SP and USP With SP, 
respectively
8. 
Rice exports from this region would increase significantly in either scenario in response 
to higher world rice prices (table 5), although SP designation would constrain the gains to some 
extent. As previously cited, trade substitution away from paddy into processed rice is expected. 
The value of U.S. rice exports is expected to increase by 58 percent and 46 percent for scenarios 
USP Without SP and USP With SP, respectively. 
 
 
                                                 
8 In 2002, this difference would have been approximately USD 100 million.  Table 7. Partial Equilibrium impact of the two scenarios on the U.S. rice industry. 
Sectoral Variable  USP Without SP  USP With SP 
Total Volume Trade  19.8%  16.3% 
Volume Trade Paddy Rice  -3.8%  -4.2% 
Volume Trade Brown Rice  48.8%  60.3% 
Of which LG  59.6%  60.7% 
Of which MG  39.9%  63.2% 
Volume Trade White Rice  27.8%  18.6% 
Of which LG  18.8%  16.2% 
Of which MG  46.6%  23.6% 
Rice Production  9.7%  8.2% 
Of which LG  8.0%  7.1% 
Of which MG  14.6%  11.5% 
Final Rice Consumption  0.3%  0.1% 
Of which LG  0.4%  1.4% 
Of which MG  -4.1%  -5.9% 
Of which FR  3.8%  4.8% 
      Export (fob) Price Rice  26.7%  24.0% 
Export (fob) Price Paddy Rice  21.3%  18.6% 
Export (fob) Price Brown Rice  37.7%  29.3% 
Of which LG  17.8%  15.6% 
Of which MG  50.7%  38.3% 
Export (fob) Price White Rice  26.5%  21.2% 
Of which LG  15.2%  13.3% 
Of which MG  45.1%  34.1% 
Producer Price LG  21.3%  18.6% 
Producer Price MG  57.7%  43.6% 
Consumer Price LG  15.2%  14.2% 
Consumer Price MG   45.1%  31.7% 
Consumer Price FR  4.5%  6.4% 
 
Approximately 82 percent of U.S. rice imports during the baseline were aromatic rice 
from Thailand and India; the remaining 18 percent were medium grain imports mainly from 
Australia. The total volume of U.S. rice imports is expected to increase by around 13 percent (56 
percent and 3.9 percent increase in medium and aromatic rice imports, respectively).  The results suggest that, given the significant increases in market prices for both long and 
medium grain rice, adjustments in the LDP program for rice to achieve a reduction in the value 
of LDP payments of 43.3 percent would not be needed. LDP payments to the medium grain 
sector are likely to be zero, whereas for the long grain sector LDP payments are estimated to 
decrease by around 34 percent when SP are considered and 31 percent when no SP are allowed. 
Conclusions 
Overall, results suggest a significant impact of sensitive product designation on 
international rice trade. Sensitive product designation is estimated to significantly affect the level 
of applied tariff and, consequently, volume of trade. Among exporters, China and the U.S., the 
major suppliers of the Japanese and South Korean markets, are likely to be negatively affected 
by the designation of rice as sensitive product. U.S. rice production and volume of exports are 
estimated to be affected by the differential concessions granted to rice.  
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Table A 1. Production and trade figures for the regions defined in RICEFLOW. 
  Production (1,000 mt milled basis)  Exports (1,000 mt milled basis)  Imports (1,000 mt milled basis) 
Region  Long Grain  Medium Grain  Fragrant  Long Grain  Medium Grain  Fragrant  Long Grain  Medium Grain  Fragrant 
Afghanistan  260  0  0  0  0  0  162  0  18 
Argentina  425  0  0  224  0  0  5  1  0 
Australia  96  410  0  96  341  0  0  2  59 
Bangladesh  25,250  0  0  0  0  0  351  4  0 
Brazil  6,880  0  0  0  0  0  557  1  0 
Canada  0  0  0  0  0  0  105  62  66 
China  82,274  54,849  0  1,653  301  0  1  2  299 
Costa Rica  100  0  0  0  0  0  86  0  0 
Cote d'Ivoire  483  0  0  0  0  0  1,434  0  0 
Cuba  200  0  0  0  0  0  537  1  0 
Egypt  0  3,775  0  0  464  0  0  0  0 
El Salvador  2  0  0  0  0  0  77  9  0 
EU-25  770  855  0  0  239  0  604  70  467 
Ghana  168  0  0  0  0  0  170  12  0 
Guatemala  30  0  0  0  0  0  47  3  0 
Guyana  265  0  0  142  0  0  0  0  0 
Haiti  35  0  0  0  0  0  285  7  0 
Honduras  6  0  0  0  0  0  99  4  0 
Hong Kong  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  43  268 
India  88,363  0  757  4,328  0  744  1  4  0 
Indonesia  33,750  0  0  0  0  0  2,968  5  0 
Iran  2,175  0  0  0  0  0  804  0  14 
Iraq  326  0  0  0  0  0  1,130  0  0 
Japan  0  8,290  0  0  0  0  77  453  85 
Kenya  30  0  0  0  0  0  163  0  0 
Malaysia  1,540  0  0  0  0  0  460  17  7 
Mexico  228  0  0  0  0  0  519  11  0 
Nicaragua  175  0  0  0  0  0  92  14  0 
Nigeria  2,270  0  0  0  0  0  1,807  0  0 Table A 1. Continued. 
  Production (1,000 mt milled basis)  Exports (1,000 mt milled basis)  Imports (1,000 mt milled basis) 
Region  Long Grain  Medium Grain  Fragrant  Long Grain  Medium Grain  Fragrant  Long Grain  Medium Grain  Fragrant 
North Korea  0  1,450  0  0  0  0  284  12  0 
Other African countries  4,273  0  0  0  0  0  1,124  130  25 
Other Asian countries  20,620  0  0  0  0  0  308  178  6 
Other Central Amer. & 
Caribbean countries  60  0  0  0  0  0  171  7  1 
Other European countries  39  0  0  0  0  0  76  168  16 
Other Middle East countries  18  0  0  0  0  0  419  274  690 
Other Oceania countries  0  0  0  0  0  0  392  54  0 
Other South American countries  2,956  0  0  0  0  0  88  5  0 
Pakistan  2,977  0  1,268  1,013  0  590  3  0  0 
Peru  1,505  0  0  0  0  0  33  0  0 
Philippines  8,050  0  0  0  0  0  1,184  0  0 
Russian Federation  330  0  0  0  0  0  301  110  4 
Saudi Arabia  97  0  0  0  0  0  199  138  523 
Senegal  55  0  0  0  0  0  894  0  0 
Singapore  0  0  0  0  0  0  401  8  2 
South Africa  0  0  0  0  0  0  706  2  1 
South Korea  0  5,510  0  0  0  0  21  145  7 
Suriname  95  0  0  37  0  0  0  0  0 
Thailand  14,392  0  3,082  5,779  0  1,583  15  0  0 
Turkey  0  245  0  0  0  0  226  117  0 
United States  5,123  1,800  0  2,473  792  0  20  66  330 
Uruguay  715  0  0  600  0  0  2  0  0 
Vietnam  21,555  0  0  3,230  0  0  9  0  0 
Yemen  0  0  0  0  0  0  154  0  29 
Total  328,960  77,183  5,108  19,574  2,138  2,918  19,574  2,138  2,918 
 